



**ARCHIVIUM HIBERNICUM**

**Irish Historical Records**

LXVI 2013

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# ARCHIVIUM HIBERNICUM

Irish Historical Records

(Incorporating since 1973 the proceedings of the  
Irish Catholic Historical Committee)

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## The Transportation of Irish Swordsmen to Sweden and Russia and plantation in Ulster (1609–1613)

The transportation of Irish soldiers to Sweden and Russia in the period 1609–13 was an episode that has received relatively little scholarly attention and remains rather poorly understood. Furthermore, the departure of so many ‘idle’ Irish swordsmen to fight in Eastern Europe was linked to the complex of processes that paved the way for the plantation of Ulster. Surprisingly the relationship between plantation and transportation schemes has not always been appreciated, neither in studies of the Ulster Plantation nor in broader studies of Stuart foreign policy. Little attention has been paid, for instance, to what happened to those who ended up fighting in Russia. When discussed at all, the significance of the transportation scheme has usually been downplayed and its voluntary aspect emphasized.<sup>1</sup> The present reassessment of the episode seeks to enlighten certain aspects of this episode and of Jacobean politics generally in Ireland.

The recent work of both Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean has greatly expanded our knowledge of recruitment for Swedish service in the seventeenth century. They have estimated that no more than 2,000 Irishmen joined Swedish military forces during the period 1609–1613.<sup>2</sup> According to Grosjean, the Irish soldiers ‘hardly made an impact at all’.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, from the evidence it appears that numbers may have been greater and that Irish soldiers ended up in multiple locations in Russia and Eastern Europe. One of the purposes of this article is to suggest some clarifications of and enhancements to the important findings of Murdoch and Grosjean. It is also intended to provide a detailed examination of the transportation scheme and the activities of the Irish soldiers sent to Eastern Europe.<sup>4</sup> It

- 1 E. Bourke, ‘Irish levies for the army of Sweden (1609–1610)’ in *Irish Monthly*, xl (1918), p. 398; G. Henry, *The Irish Military Community in Spanish Flanders, 1586–1621* (Dublin, 1992), [hereafter cited as IMC], pp 41–2.
- 2 S. Murdoch and A. Grosjean, ‘Irish Soldiers in Swedish Service, 1609–1613’ in *The Irish Sword*, xxiv, 96 (Winter 2004), pp 161–3; S. Murdoch, ‘The Northern Flight: Irish Soldiers in Seventeenth-century Scandinavia’ in T. O’ Connor and M. Lyons (eds), *The Ulster Earls and Baroque Europe: Refashioning Irish Identities, 1600–1800* (Dublin, 2010), pp 90–2.
- 3 A. Grosjean, ‘Scotland: Sweden’s Closest Ally?’ in Steve Murdoch (ed), *Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War 1618–1648* (Leiden, 2001), pp 145–6.
- 4 A minor problem that may lead to confusion is that Murdoch (‘The Northern Flight’, p.



is thereby hoped to draw attention to the significance of the departure of these groups of Irish for the nature and course of plantation in Ulster and the subsequent history of the province.

A few scholars have already suggested a direct – possibly ‘Machiavellian’ – connection between the transportation and plantation schemes.<sup>5</sup> There may be something to this, especially given that Sir Arthur Chichester, the Lord Deputy of Ireland, boasted in 1614 that he had sent 6,000 ‘bad and disloyal’ Irishmen to Sweden during the early years of Plantation.<sup>6</sup> Involuntary conscription was a common feature of early modern European military life and Ireland was no exception. Although many in Ireland were forced into military service it is important to remember that others left home because they no longer had any means of livelihood and few opportunities. It may be possible to argue that, in certain cases, coerced transportation to Sweden functioned as a form of state punishment imposed on real or potential opponents of the Ulster Plantation. It would seem that perhaps up to half of the Irish soldiers recruited for Sweden were pressed into involuntary military service, and it is probable that the rest departed under varying kinds and degrees of duress.<sup>7</sup> According to contemporary accounts, the Irish considered the forced exile of their countrymen to Sweden ‘to be the greatest cruelty ever inflicted on any people’ and denounced it as nothing less than monstrous.<sup>8</sup> In 1615 Hugh O’Neill (Earl of Tyrone) wrote to the Spanish Council of State assessing the transportation of his countrymen to Sweden:

With the pretense of sending help to the King of Sweden, the

- 91 nn.14–18) cites information in the *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in other Libraries of Northern Italy*, xi (1607–1610) (London, 1904), concerning the recruitment of Irish soldiers for Swedish service. Those references are mistaken; instead, Murdoch’s notes should refer to the *Calendar of State Papers, Relating to Ireland, of the Reign of James I, 1603–1625. Preserved in Her Majesty’s Public Record Office* (5 vols, London, 1872–80) [hereafter cited as CSPI]. Another mistaken citation in Murdoch and Grosjean, ‘Irish Soldiers’, p. 161 n.1 and Murdoch, ‘The Northern Flight’, p. 90 n.12, p. 91 n.21 is The National Archives, Public Record Office, State Papers [hereafter cited as NA, PRO, SP] 95 (Sweden), pt.1, f. 187 for TNA PRO, SP 95, pt. 1, f. 177, James Spens to Robert Cecil, 8 November 1610.
- 5 M. Jansson and N. Rogozhin (eds), *England and the North: The Russian Embassy of 1613–1614* (Philadelphia, 1994), pp 49–50; M. Ailes, *Military Migration and State Formation: The British Military Community in Seventeenth-Century Sweden* (Lincoln, NE, 2002), pp 26–7; S. Connolly, *Contested island: Ireland 1460–1630* (Oxford, 2007), p. 291.
- 6 CSPI, iv, p. 480.
- 7 J. McCavitt, *The Flight of the Earls* (Dublin, 2002), pp 157–8; D. Edwards, ‘Legacy of defeat: the reduction of Gaelic Ireland after Kinsale’, in H. Morgan (ed), *The Battle of Kinsale* (Dublin, 2004), pp 293–4; Connolly, *Contested island*, pp 290–1; P. Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest: Ireland 1603–1727* (Harlow, 2008), p. 51.
- 8 CSPI, iii, p. 476; C. Maxwell, *Irish History from Contemporary Sources (1509–1610)* (London, 1923), p. 292; Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, p. 49; M. Hickson, *Ireland in the Seventeenth Century, or the Irish Massacres of 1641–2* (London, 1884), p. 13.

English King has levied great numbers of Irish several times during these past years and scuttled the ships in which they were embarked. By various means he has achieved his purpose that none should return to Ireland alive. In all these ways he has procured to sap the strength of the Catholics so that, thus weakened, they may not resist the final blow which he intends to strike by depopulating the whole island of its ancient inhabitants who have possessed it for more than three thousand years when they came from Spain to live there. The expulsion is not merely a conjecture but a decree of the English Council of State of which we were informed by secret means. There is nothing which the King of England desires more for the glory of his crown than to assure himself of Ireland by depopulating it and establishing there those Englishmen who are in overabundance in his own kingdom.<sup>9</sup>

O'Neill's description is obviously exaggerated and emotionally overwrought, but there is more than a small grain of truth contained within it. The exiled earl's words also reflect what many in Ireland believed was happening as plantation in Ulster progressed.

To a certain extent the end of the Nine Years War in 1603 was the death-knell of the old order in Ireland. However, the government in Ireland faced an immediate and serious problem: the continuing presence of large numbers of soldiers who had fought with the various factions during the course of the Nine Years War. These 'idle swordsmen' represented a particular challenge in as much as their continuing depredations not only tested the resources of the government to control them, but also seemed to militate against the ultimate goal of the victors – the establishment, through plantation and other means, of a civil and English society in Ireland. The accession of James VI of Scotland to the English and Irish thrones did not fundamentally alter the crown's objectives in Ireland or its assessment of the threat to civil society posed by those 'idle swordsmen'.<sup>10</sup>

There were two pressing reasons for addressing the problem of these unemployed soldiers. In the first place, although Hugh O'Neill had fled Ulster in 1607 and eventually settled in Rome, rumours of his impending return to Ireland circulated widely for several years. Until 1610, there was an expectation, among some of his former followers, of his imminent return. This prospect, however chimerical, was not welcome in government circles as it represented a threat to the permanence of the conquest

9 M. Walsh (ed), *'Destruction by Peace', Hugh O'Neill after Kinsale: Glanconcadhaim 1602 – Rome 1616* (Armagh, 1986), p. 347.

10 D. Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 2000), pp 24–7, 55–8; A. Cathcart, 'The Statutes of Iona: The Archipelagic Context' in *Journal of British Studies* 51, 1 (January 2010), pp 14–15.



of O'Neill country. There was a more mundane issue too. After his departure, O'Neill's men (they could hardly have done otherwise) lived off the land, imposing themselves by force upon those populations which had traditionally sustained them. The presence of these swordsmen was alienating old support networks and served as a deterrent to would-be settlers. For the Irish government, it was hard to argue that Ireland was a desirable place to settle, establish farms and prosper when sedentary populations were at the mercy of leaderless and disaffected soldiers. A possible solution to both of these problems emerged in an unexpected way.<sup>11</sup>

In 1608 King Karl IX (r.1604–1611) of Sweden sent an embassy to James I to request permission to recruit British soldiers for service in Russia in a war he, and his ally Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii (r. 1606–10), were fighting against King Sigismund III (r.1587–1632) of Poland-Lithuania. The Swedish embassy was well timed. During the first years of his reign, James had steadfastly refused to recognize Karl as the legitimate king of Sweden. Although Sweden was a Protestant country, James regarded Karl as a usurper and recognized instead the arch-Catholic Sigismund III's claim to the Swedish throne. By 1608, however, the Stuart flirtation with Catholic Poland had waned and British relations with Sweden improved.<sup>12</sup> Karl IX's embassy to England in December 1608 was followed up by another in February 1609. Negotiations were cordial and led James to recognize formally Karl's claim to the Swedish throne.<sup>13</sup> James allowed Karl quietly to recruit Scottish soldiers, and as a result, many Scots were serving in Swedish military forces by 1609. One of these Scots, Sir James Spens, became Karl IX's principal military recruiter in Britain and headed the Swedish embassy to King James, in search of better relations and more

- 11 Although Scottish kings had sought to reduce the Gaelic-speaking west to civility since the fifteenth century, the Statutes of Iona (1609) represented an essentially moderate policy of accommodation and concession in order to integrate the MacDonalds of the Isles and associated clans into the Scottish state. (See Cathcart, 'The Statutes of Iona', pp 4–27.) The imposition of such a radically different policy in the north of Ireland clearly indicates a different history, the presence of divergent local and regional factors, and the emergence of a new politico-religious reality in Europe.
- 12 Soon after becoming king of England, James VI of Scotland began calling himself 'King of Great Britain', and he actively promoted the concept of a single British state, a 'British military identity', and a 'pan-British agenda' in foreign relations. See G.P.V. Akrigg (ed), *Letters of King James VI & I* (Berkeley, 1984), pp 224–5; S. Murdoch, 'Diplomacy in Transition: Stuart-British Diplomacy in Northern Europe, 1603–1618' in A. McInnes, T. Riis, and F. Pedersen (eds), *Ships, Guns, and Bibles in the North Sea and the Baltic States* (East Linton, 2002), pp 93–4; S. Murdoch, 'James VI and the Formation of Scottish-British Military Identity', in S. Murdoch and A. Mackillop (eds), *Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience c. 1550–1900* (Leiden, 2000), pp 3–4, 16.
- 13 A. Grosjean, *An Unofficial Alliance: Scotland and Sweden 1569–1654* (Leiden, 2005), pp 27–8; M. Ailes, 'From British Mercenaries to Swedish Nobles: The Immigration of British Soldiers to Sweden during the Seventeenth Century' (PhD thesis, University of Minnesota, 1997), pp 27–8; Murdoch, 'Diplomacy', p. 101.

mercenary soldiers.<sup>14</sup> The other large-scale military recruiters for Karl at this time were two brothers of the earl of Orkney, Sir Robert and Sir William Stewart (kinsmen of King James).<sup>15</sup>

Karl IX relied heavily on foreign mercenaries, including Scots and Englishmen, to supplement Swedish soldiers fighting against Poland-Lithuania. By 1608 Karl had good reason to ask James for permission to recruit more soldiers. Sweden's neighbour Russia was experiencing its horrific 'Time of Troubles' (1598–1613). In 1606 Tsar Dmitrii was assassinated by a small group of aristocrats, triggering civil war. The usurper Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii denounced the dead Dmitrii as an impostor, but the former tsar's supporters successfully circulated the story that Tsar Dmitrii had escaped death and would soon return to punish the traitors. So energetic was the response to the call to arms against Shuiskii that civil war raged for years, throwing up several impostors claiming to be Tsar Dmitrii or other members of the extinct ruling dynasty. Russia's internal disorder eventually prompted Polish and Swedish military intervention. In 1608 a desperate Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii approached Karl IX with a request for military assistance. Karl took maximum advantage of Shuiskii's distress to force him to cede to Sweden valuable territory on the Baltic coastline in return for the promise to provide Shuiskii with up to 5,000 mercenary soldiers to be paid for by the Russians.<sup>16</sup> Karl turned to James for assistance in recruiting those soldiers, and James proved receptive to the idea. Spens and the Stewart brothers had already received permission to recruit soldiers in Scotland, and, starting in early 1609, James authorized Karl's agents to levy soldiers in Ireland.<sup>17</sup>

Long before James authorized Swedish recruitment in Ireland, the problem of what to do with thousands of 'idle' Irish soldiers – who had no place in Stuart plans for Ireland's future – was actively discussed in London and Dublin.<sup>18</sup> During the century before the Battle of Kinsale (1601), the

14 J. Miller, *Swords for Hire: The Scottish Mercenary* (Edinburgh, 2007), pp 81–4; Murdoch, 'Diplomacy', pp 101–03; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp 26–7; A. Åberg, 'Scottish Soldiers in the Swedish Armies in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', in G. Simpson (ed.), *Scotland and Scandinavia* (Edinburgh, 1990), pp 90–1.

15 J. Berg and B. Lagercrantz, *Scots in Sweden* (Stockholm, 1962), pp 26–8; T. Fischer, *The Scots in Sweden: Being a Contribution towards the History of The Scot Abroad* (Edinburgh, 1907), pp 71–2; Miller, *Swords for Hire*, pp 82–3.

16 C. Dunning, *Russia's First Civil War: The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty* (University Park, PA, 2001), pp 396, 402; M. Roberts, *The Early Vasas* (Cambridge, 1968), p. 453.

17 Ailes, *Military Migration*, pp 9–11.

18 B. Lenman, *England's Colonial Wars 1550–1688: Conflicts, Empire and National Identity* (London, 2001), pp 118–19; L. Cullen, 'The Irish Diaspora of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries' in N. Canny (ed), *Europeans on the Move: Studies on European Migration, 1500–1800* (Oxford, 1994), pp 121–2; G. Henry, "'Wild Geese" in Spanish Flanders: the first generation 1586–1610' in *The Irish Sword* xvii, 68 (1989), p. 190; J. Casway, 'Henry O'Neill and the formation of the Irish regiment in the Netherlands, 1605' in *Irish Historical Studies* xviii, 72 (September 1973), p. 482.



population of Ireland, as in other parts of Eurasia, had doubled. It would appear that the number of younger sons of the Gaelic elite multiplied at a higher rate than the overall population growth, intensifying clan rivalries and contributing to conflict, poverty, and restlessness.<sup>19</sup> By the beginning of the seventeenth century, Ireland (like most of northern Europe) also faced frequent food shortages due to overpopulation and crop failures associated with the 'little ice age'.<sup>20</sup> From the outset of James's reign Ireland was marked by poor harvests and outbreaks of plague. During 1607 and 1608, which were relatively good years, grain sold for almost twice the average price and famine loomed on the horizon. Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that many Irishmen migrated to England or the Continent in search of employment and to avoid starvation.<sup>21</sup>

Starting in the 1580s a stream of Irish soldiers left home to join the armies of European monarchs. It has been estimated that during the first decades of the seventeenth century, on average between 500 and 1,200 Irishmen left Ireland for Europe every year, largely due to lack of employment and famine.<sup>22</sup> As might be expected, the pace of migration picked up after the Kinsale debacle and spiked again after the so called 'Flight of the earls' in 1607, when Hugh O'Neill and other Gaelic earls hastily left Ireland for what turned out to be permanent exile on the Continent. This first wave of seventeenth-century Irish migration peaked in the period 1605–1607.<sup>23</sup> In 1607 alone it has been suggested that as many as 5,000 migrated to Continental Europe. France was inundated with Irish beggars, and many Irish soldiers made their way to the Netherlands.<sup>24</sup> Continental authorities had no interest in the Irish beggars but they were willing to hire unemployed soldiers. Thus a significant number of Irish came to

- 19 C. Dunning, 'Does Jack Goldstone's Model of Early Modern State Crises Apply to Russia?' in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* xxxix, 3 (1997), pp 572–92; IMC, p. 5; Cullen, 'Irish Diaspora', p. 122; Miller, *Swords for Hire*, p. 12.
- 20 A. Appleby, *Famine in Tudor and Stuart England* (Stanford, 1978), pp 109, 112, 133–4; idem, 'Epidemics and Famine in the Little Ice Age', in R. Rotberg and T. Rabb (eds), *Climate and History: Studies in Interdisciplinary History* (Princeton, 1981), pp 64–83; D. Kirby, *Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period: The Baltic World 1492–1772* (New York, 1990), pp 150–3; Dunning, *Russia's First Civil War*, pp 17–21; H. Kamen, *Iron Century: Social Change in Europe 1550–1660* (London, 1976), pp 366–75, 384.
- 21 R. Gillespie, 'Harvest Crisis in early seventeenth-century Ireland', in *Irish Economic and Social History* xi (1984), pp 7–9; Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, pp 17–18; Henry, 'Wild Geese', p. 192; J. McGurk, 'Wild Geese: The Irish in European armies (sixteenth to eighteenth centuries)' in P. O'Sullivan (ed), *The Irish World Wide: History, Heritage, Identity*, vol. 1, *Patterns of Migration* (Leicester, 1992), pp 37–8, 42.
- 22 Cullen, 'Irish Diaspora', p. 139.
- 23 IMC, pp 192–4.
- 24 R. Stradling, *The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries: The Wild Geese in Spain 1618–68* (Dublin, 1994), p. 17; M. Lyons, "'Vagabonds", "Mendiant", "Gueux": French Reaction to Irish Immigration in the Early Seventeenth Century' in *French History* xiv, 4 (2000), pp 365–7; E. Hernán, 'Irish clerics in Madrid, 1598–1665' in T. O'Connor and M. Lyons (eds), *Irish Communities in Early-Modern Europe* (Dublin, 2006), pp 270–1.



serve the king of Spain, especially in Flanders. Estimates of the number of Irish soldiers migrating to the Spanish Netherlands during the quarter century before James authorized the Swedish levies in 1609 range from 10,000 to 20,000.<sup>25</sup> In the Army of Flanders the 'wild geese' found a home away from home. In 1605 Spanish authorities allowed the Irish to form their own regiment commanded by one of Hugh O'Neill's sons. The Regiment of Tyrone (or O'Neill Regiment) quickly swelled to fifteen companies and 1,700 men.<sup>26</sup>

The general policy of Elizabeth I and James I was to encourage 'idle' Irish soldiers to serve abroad, thereby lessening the burden of overpopulation and hunger in Ireland and ridding the island of potential government opponents. Once they departed, these soldiers were not welcome back in Ireland.<sup>27</sup> Unsurprisingly, both Elizabeth and James not only permitted but even encouraged Irish troop levies by foreign powers, including Catholic Spain and France. Although officially voluntary, such levies were often coercive; but at least they provided employment and food.<sup>28</sup> Little attention was paid at the time to the potential threat to English and Irish government control in Ireland posed by Catholic monarchs hiring thousands of Irish soldiers. Instead, there was general relief at the departure of those troublesome 'idle swordsmen'.

Irish and English government attitudes toward the Irish hardened significantly in the wake of O'Doherty's Rebellion in April 1608. The rebellion was quickly crushed, but it badly frightened government authorities who now had reason to change their minds on how to execute the planned plantations in Ulster. Until this time it was intended to include 'loyal Irish' in the plantation scheme.<sup>29</sup> In the aftermath of the rebellion, however, there was a shift in strategy. During the autumn of 1608 a committee was formed in London to draw up plans for plantation in Ulster. It chose to exclude the Irish from participation, thereby necessitating the uprooting of the native land owners and in many areas of those who worked

- 25 McGurk, 'Wild Geese', pp 39–40; Edwards, 'Legacy', pp 292–3. On the organization and activities of 'Irish tercios' in the Spanish Netherlands, see Eduardo de Mesa Gallego, *La pacificación de Flandes Spinola y las campañas de Frisia (1604–1609)* (Madrid, 2009).
- 26 M. Walsh, 'The Wild Goose tradition' in *The Irish Sword* xvii (1987–88), pp 4–5; IMC, pp 39–42, 46–8, 52, 145.
- 27 J. Silke, 'The Irish Abroad', in T. Moody, F. Martin, and F. Byrne (eds), *A New History of Ireland*, vol. 3, *Early Modern Ireland 1534–1691* (Oxford, 1976), p. 593; McGurk, 'Wild Geese', p. 43; Ailes, *Military Migration*, pp 26–7; IMC, p. 37; Cullen, 'Irish Diaspora', p. 122; M. Lyons, *Franco-Irish Relations, 1500–1610: Politics, Migration and Trade* (Woodbridge, 2003), p. 183.
- 28 G. Henry, 'Ulster Exiles in Europe, 1605–1641' in B. MacCuarta (ed.), *Ulster 1641: Aspects of the Rising* (Belfast, 1993), pp 38–41; IMC, pp 45–8; McCavitt, *Flight*, pp 157–8, 171–2; Maxwell, *Irish History*, pp 74–5; Connolly, *Contested island*, p. 291.
- 29 J. McCavitt, *Sir Arthur Chichester, Lord Deputy of Ireland* (Belfast, 1998), pp 12–13; Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, p. 44; R. Gillespie, *Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Making Ireland Modern* (Dublin, 2006), pp 44–7; Connolly, *Contested island*, pp 270, 276.

the land. The actions of the rebel lords were cited as sufficient reason to confiscate the property of all Ulster lords, even those who were not supporters of Hugh O'Neill and who had not participated in O'Doherty's Rebellion. The confiscated lands immediately opened up four million acres for plantation.<sup>30</sup> This change was also influenced by racial and religious prejudices. It was argued at the time that separating the Irish from planted colonists was necessary to avoid 'contamination'. This idea had been advocated by King James himself in *Basilicon Doron*, published in 1599. In this work, the king proposed 'rooting out or transporting the barbarous and stubborn sort' in the Western Isles to make way for civilized colonists.<sup>31</sup> Before agreeing to the moderate Statutes of Iona in 1609, James experimented with a plantation policy in Scotland that anticipated some of the tactics used in Ulster. James came to see that potential instability in newly pacified Ulster endangered his efforts to civilize the western Highlands and the Hebrides. Not surprisingly, O'Doherty's Rebellion shocked the king who saw it as a serious threat to Scotland. James especially feared cooperation between Gaelic rebels in Ireland and malcontents in western Scotland. O'Doherty's Rebellion gave James the excuse and opportunity to impose a harsher policy in Ireland designed to prevent any such rebel cooperation in the future. James's anxiety about pacifying western Scotland strongly influenced the composition of the colonizing population in the Ulster plantations.<sup>32</sup>

The policy of excluding loyal Irish from the Ulster Plantation was associated with Sir John Davies, an official of the Irish government. Compared with him, Lord Deputy Chichester has often been viewed as a moderate. That is not entirely accurate as, from the policy view-point, there was little difference between the two men.<sup>33</sup> It is true that Chichester initially favoured including the Irish in the Plantation of Ulster, but as lord deputy he changed his mind. Even before O'Doherty's Rebellion, Chichester had harassed Catholics in general and was particularly intolerant of local lords he deemed untrustworthy, to the point of drawing criticism from London for his heavy-handed tactics. Over the years Chichester systematically demilitarized Ireland, ridding it of private armies and disarming Irish travellers.<sup>34</sup> The lord deputy was quick to recognize the opportunities provided

30 F. Harris, 'The Rebellion of Sir Cahir O'Doherty and Its Legal Aftermath' in *The Irish Jurist* xv, 2 (1980), pp 299-300; Gillespie, *Seventeenth-Century Ireland*, pp 47-8; Edwards, 'Legacy', p. 279; Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, pp 30, 41, 44-5, 48.

31 Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, pp 41-5; N. Rhodes, J. Richards, and J. Marshall (eds), *King James VI and I: Selected Writings* (Burlington, VT, 2003), p. 222.

32 Armitage, *Ideological Origins*, pp 26-7, 55-8; Cathcart, 'Statutes of Iona', pp 4-10, 14-21, 25-6.

33 N. Canny, *Making Ireland British 1580-1650* (Oxford, 2001), p. 189; Connolly, *Contested island*, p. 291; Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, p. 48; McCavitt, *Flight*, p. 154; Gillespie, *Seventeenth-Century Ireland*, p. 47.

34 CSPI, i, pp 259-60; Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, pp 34-6; Edwards, 'Legacy', pp 284-5, 290-2; D. Edwards, 'The plight of the earls: Tyrone and Tyrconnell's "Grievances" and crown



by O'Doherty's Rebellion, and London was so grateful for the prompt suppression of the uprising that criticism of Chichester's tyrannical regime all but ceased.<sup>35</sup> As of September 1608, many of the principal Ulster rebels of the Nine Years War were still at large, hiding out in remote areas. In retaliation Chichester adopted a ruthless policy (including murder, crop destruction, stoking clan feuds, and terror) combined with aggressive legal procedures, 'show-trials', and ruinous fines for harbouring fugitives.<sup>36</sup> While Chichester waged all-out war against the remaining rebel lords, the London-based committee began making plans for an Irish-free plantation of Ulster. It would be difficult to imagine that the lord deputy disapproved of the committee's work.

O'Doherty's Rebellion destroyed James I's and Chichester's faith in the lesser Irish lords – now regarded as completely unreliable – and opened up the possibility of extending the plantation into 'the Gaelic heartland itself'.<sup>37</sup> With Hugh O'Neill and other Irish chieftains already in exile, Chichester was determined to use the suppression of O'Doherty's Rebellion to eliminate the second layer of Irish political and military leadership that had remained intact and concentrated in Ulster. Chichester feared that the Ulster lords were ideally positioned to facilitate an eventual invasion of Ireland by the Army of Flanders. It was essential, therefore, to get rid of those dangerous men.<sup>38</sup> To pacify Ulster (and the rest of Ireland) it was also deemed necessary to deal with the large number of defeated and unemployed rebel soldiers, the so-called 'idle swordsmen' who had become a chronic problem for the government and indeed for the general population. In addition to security concerns, it was assumed that Irish soldiers could not live peacefully next to the proposed loyal colonists. As a result, enlisting those unruly elements in foreign military service emerged as a prerequisite for the success of the plantation. Thus it may be argued that there was a connection between the entire plantation scheme and the authorization of foreign governments to recruit Irish soldiers.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, due to growing fear that Hugh O'Neill and the Spaniards were plotting an invasion of Ireland, King James was now reluctant to

coercion in Ulster, 1603–7' in T. O'Connor and M. Lyons (eds), *The Ulster Earls and Baroque Europe: Refashioning Irish Identities, 1600–1800* (Dublin, 2009), pp 56–61, 72–3.

- 35 Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, p. 44. Sir Julius Caesar accused Chichester of having 'tyrannised' Ireland; see British Library, Lansdowne Manuscripts 142, f. 395, memorandum of Julius Caesar, 14 April 1613.
- 36 McCavitt, *Flight*, pp 155–6; Connolly, *Contested island*, p. 277; Edwards, 'Legacy', pp 290–1.
- 37 Canny, *Making Ireland British*, pp 85, 189–93, 197; Connolly, *Contested island*, p. 290.
- 38 Harris, 'Rebellion', pp 299, 303; Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, pp 36, 42; IMC, pp 47–8; McCavitt, *Sir Arthur Chichester*, pp 118, 124; Lyons, 'Vagabonds', p. 366.
- 39 M. Walsh, *An Exile of Ireland: Hugh O'Neill, Prince of Ulster* (Dublin, 1996), p. 93; idem, 'Wild Goose Tradition', p. 6; McCavitt, *Flight*, p. 154; Casway, 'Henry O'Neill', pp 482–4; IMC, pp 28–9; McGurk, 'Wild Geese', p. 42; Ailes, *Military Migration*, pp 11, 27; Connolly, *Contested island*, pp 290–1.

permit many more Irish to migrate to the Netherlands. For James, Karl IX's request provided a militarily less risky destination for Irish soldiers. James was pleased by this timely request and quickly approved Swedish levies in Ireland, hoping thereby to rid Ulster of unwanted Irish soldiers. Some scholars are convinced that it was James who initiated the contact and quietly encouraged Karl to request permission to hire Irish troops, but there is no evidence that James did anything more than seize an opportunity provided by the Swedish request.<sup>40</sup>

Whoever took the initiative, James and Karl quickly struck a deal that did more than allow Sweden to recruit Irish soldiers. The Swedish ambassador's entourage included high ranking military advisors (many of whom were Scots) and at least some discussions appear to have focused on the logistics of transporting Irish soldiers to Eastern Europe.<sup>41</sup> James not only agreed to instruct Irish officials to cooperate with Swedish recruiters, but he also undertook to subsidize the transportation by paying part of the cost of moving recruits to Irish ports, feeding them, and outfitting them with new clothes and shoes.<sup>42</sup> Surviving records from the period 1608-11 show that the English Exchequer paid out more than £6,900 to fit out and transport Irish soldiers to Sweden.<sup>43</sup> That was a large expenditure at a time the Stuart government was financially strapped, indicating it was a high priority of James and his advisors.

Behind the British government's willingness to shoulder expenses associated with transporting Irish soldiers to Sweden was the fear that Hugh O'Neill might at any time lead an invasion of Ireland that would trigger an uprising.<sup>44</sup> At the time of the plantation in Ulster, there were more than 12,000 'unemployed' Irish soldiers in Ireland, perhaps up to 4,000 in Ulster alone.<sup>45</sup> Traditionally, English propaganda had made Irish soldiers out to be little more than savages, although Henry VIII and Elizabeth I had

<sup>40</sup> B. Bonner, *That Audacious Traitor* (Baile Átha Cliath, 1975), p. 207; Walsh, 'Destruction by Peace', p. 347; Cullen, 'Irish Diaspora', p. 122; Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, pp 43-4; Edwards, 'Legacy', pp 293-4.

<sup>41</sup> Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp 27-8; Murdoch, 'Diplomacy', p. 101; Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, p. 72.

<sup>42</sup> F. Devon (ed), *Issues of the Exchequer, being payments made out of His Majesty's revenues during the reign of King James I: extracted from original records* (London, 1836), p. 102; J. Nichols, *The Topographer and Genealogist*, vol. 3 (London, 1858), pp 90-1; G. Hill, *An historical account of the plantation in Ulster at the commencement of the seventeenth century, 1608-1620* (Shannon, 1970), p. 253; IMC, p. 41.

<sup>43</sup> S. Gardiner, *History of England from the accession of James I. to the disgrace of Chief-justice Coke: 1603-1616* (2 vols, London, 1863), ii, p. 420.

<sup>44</sup> Casway, 'Henry O'Neill', pp 482-4, 487-8; McGurk, 'Wild Geese', p. 41; McCavitt, *Flight*, p. 157.

<sup>45</sup> CSPI, iii, p. 299; R. Fitzsimon, 'Irish Swordsmen in the Imperial Service in the 30 Years War' in *The Irish Sword* 9 (1969), p. 23; J. O'Meagher, *Some Historical Notices of the O'Meaghers of Ikerrin* (New York, 1890), p. 54. Walsh (*An Exile of Ireland*, p. 93) estimated that up to 20,000 Irish soldiers were living in Ireland in 1609 but provided no evidence to support that high estimate.



both found them useful and effective.<sup>46</sup> Early modern Ireland produced modest numbers of cavalymen but hordes of effective infantrymen. The 'gallowglas' were high-status professional soldiers who wore armor; the 'kern' (or 'wood-kerne') were light infantry militiamen. Irish soldiers had a well deserved reputation for hardiness and for handling their weapons with skill. Before his defeat and flight, Hugh O'Neill did an excellent job of training large numbers of Irish soldiers and accustoming them to gunpowder warfare and modern military tactics. Under his leadership, many of the gallowglas became pikemen and many of the kern became effective harquebusiers. Over the course of a decade O'Neill had trained his men well, methodically laying the foundation for a permanent Irish army.<sup>47</sup> Even without "The O'Neill" to lead them, the presence of many well-trained Irish soldiers represented a significant potential threat to the plantation and to government control of Ireland.

The first royal commission to recruit and transport 1,000 Irish soldiers to Sweden was issued to Sir Robert and Sir William Stewart in February 1609.<sup>48</sup> They wasted no time hiring captains to recruit soldiers, organize companies, and lead the men to Sweden. Several captains who recruited Irish soldiers for Swedish service were handsomely rewarded, receiving large estates when they were enrolled as 'undertakers' or 'military servitors' in the plantation of Ulster. That influential group included Captains Nicholas Pynner (1,000 acres), William Stewart (1,000 acres), Richard Tyrrell (1,000 acres), and Richard Bingley (500 acres).<sup>49</sup> Captains Gabriel Throgmorton and John Maisteron were also recommended as worthy to be undertakers in Ulster but ended up not participating.<sup>50</sup> One captain had to wait until 1613 to receive his reward but it was worth waiting for. Here is an extract from the Patent Rolls of James I, dated 14 March 1613:<sup>51</sup>

46 R. Rapple, *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture: Military Men in England and Ireland, 1558–1594* (Cambridge, 2009), p. 220; McGurk, 'Wild Geese', p. 40; D. White, 'Henry VIII's Irish Kerne in France and Scotland, 1544–45' in *The Irish Sword*, iii (1957–58), pp 213–14.

47 Murdoch, 'The Northern Flight', p. 90; R. Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers, Poland-Lithuania and the Thirty Years' War', in S. Murdoch (ed), *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War* (Leiden, 2001), pp 203–4; G. Hayes-McCoy, 'Strategy and Tactics in Irish Warfare, 1593–1601' in *Irish Historical Studies* ii (1940–1), pp 255–62; R. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army 1585–1702* (Oxford, 2006), pp 17–19; Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, pp 14–15; P. Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars: War, Government, and Society in Tudor England, 1544–1604* (New York, 2003), pp 72–3.

48 TNA, PRO, SP 95 (Sweden), pt. 1, f. 156, Andrew Greep to Robert Cecil, 28 July 1609.

49 CSPI, iii, pp 366–8, 468–9, 547–8; Hill, *An historical account*, pp 287–8, 326, 347, 449, 507, 511–12, 522–3, 533; Lenman, *England's Colonial Wars*, p. 165; Miller, *Swords for Hire*, pp 81–2; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 29; Edwards, 'Legacy', p. 294; McCavitt, *Flight*, p. 159; W. Borowy, 'Anglicy, Szkoci i Irlandczycy w woysku polskim za Zygmunta III', in H. Barycz and J. Hulewicz (eds), *Studia z dziejów kultury polskiej* (Warsaw, 1949), p. 298.

50 CSPI, iii, pp 428, 461.

51 CSPI, iv, p. 329; S. Cox, 'The Plantation of Ulster' in R. O'Brien (ed), *Studies in Irish History 1603–1649* (Dublin, 1906), p. 26; S. Urban, 'Correspondence of Sylvanus Urban' in *The*

King's letter for a grant to Capt. John Sanford, his heirs and assigns for ever, all such escheated mountain lands, bogs and woods in the province of Ulster as are come to the King's hands by the attainder of the late Earls of Tirone and Tierconnell, or any of their adherents, or any other traitors, or which otherwise belong to the Crown, and are not now in charge, to be holden under the conditions of the plantation of Ulster, at a yearly rent of 10s. This grant is made in consideration of Capt. Sanford's absence, during the distribution of the escheated lands in Ulster, in consequence of which no portion was assigned to him, he being then engaged in conducting the loose kerne and swordsmen of that province to the service of the King of Sweden, disburthening the country, by that means, of many turbulent and disaffected persons, who would otherwise have troubled the peace.

As already mentioned, the Stuart government took responsibility from the beginning for costs associated with recruiting, moving soldiers to port, and feeding and outfitting them before embarkation. During the first several months of the recruitment campaign – the voluntary phase – the English Exchequer paid out £950 for those expenses.<sup>52</sup> These early levies were more or less voluntary. Some soldiers were pressed into service against their will, but many volunteered, often out of desperation and hunger.<sup>53</sup> Irish soldiers were offered wages averaging eight pence per day.<sup>54</sup> Few recruits received impress money, but all of them were fed from the day they agreed to serve. In fact, food may have been the recruiters' most valuable allurements. In 1613 Sir Fulke Conway, a close associate Lord Deputy Chichester who was experienced in such matters, described how to recruit Irish soldiers for service in Russia:<sup>55</sup>

For victualles their maie be butter pork & bisquit pyved in Ireland & for beof duringe the time the armie shalbe at the water syde & in harbor, & for one month after, but for the rest of the voyadge it

*Gentleman's Magazine* xxxix (January–June 1853), p. 269; J. Graves, *The History, Architecture, and Antiquities of the Cathedral Church of St. Canise, Kilkenny* (Dublin, 1857), p. 317; Nichols, *Topographer*, p. 90 n. Thanks to the king's letter, on 7 July 1613, Captain Sanford received a grant to hold forever many mountains, bogs and woods in the counties of Armagh, Tyrone, Monaghan, Fermanagh, Donegal, and Cavan; see *Ulster Journal of Archaeology* v (1894), p. 251.

52 Gardiner, *History of England*, ii, p. 420.

53 Edwards, 'Legacy', pp 293–4; McCavitt, *Flight*, pp 157–8; IMC, p. 41.

54 *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Honourable the Marquess of Salisbury preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire* [hereafter cited as CMS], vol. 21 (1609–1612) (London, 1970), p. 202.

55 TNA, PRO, SP 91 (Russia), pt. 1, f. 250v, Fulke Conway to George Abbot, spring 1613; C. Dunning, 'The Richest Place in the World: An Early 17th-Century English Description and Military Assessment of Solovetskii Monastery' in C. Dunning, R. Martin, and D. Rowland (eds), *Rude & Barbarous Kingdom Revisited* (Bloomington, IN, 2008), pp 309–25.



wilbe best to pyde english beof. The victualles their wilbe beter cheape if readie mony be to paie for it, then in England. They maie have bere their lykwyse for readie mony whylst the shippes lie in harbor, but for no longer time.

Note that Conway includes advice about separating the soldiers from their meager pay by selling them beer 'for readie mony'. Whether captains sold the beer themselves or split the profits with local concessionaires, there was clearly money to be made organizing companies of soldiers for Swedish service.

Surviving records are incomplete so there is no way to know exactly how many soldiers were recruited or the number of ships that took them to Sweden or Swedish-controlled Narva. Estimates range from 2,000 to 6,000. At some point Karl IX's other principal military recruiter, James Spens, began levying troops in Ireland in competition with the Stewarts, whose recruiting efforts were sluggish. It should be noted that not all levies by Spens's Scottish captains were authorized by King James or even recorded in Dublin.<sup>56</sup> It has long been assumed that the first shipload of soldiers departed from Ireland in early August 1609.<sup>57</sup> But by May Captain Nicholas Pynner had already entered Swedish service to command 200 Irish foot-soldiers and 100 Irish cavalymen.<sup>58</sup> Another captain, Gabriel Thorgmorton, also recruited and led a company of Irish soldiers to Sweden in the spring of 1609. Upon arrival, the soldiers were taken away from Throgmorton, divided into units, and placed under the command of Swedish or Scottish officers. Undaunted, Throgmorton returned to Ireland and raised another company for Swedish service.<sup>59</sup> One of the most successful recruiters, Captain Richard Bingley, levied men primarily in Ulster and Leinster and set sail for Sweden in early August 1609 with 240 Irish soldiers who were described at the time as 'ill affected' men, mostly 'idle swordsmen' who had participated in O'Doherty's Rebellion or were associated with Hugh O'Neill.<sup>60</sup> Bingley's efforts impressed the Swedes, and in late 1609 'Colonel' Richard Bingley was commissioned by Karl IX to recruit 1,000 more Irish soldiers.<sup>61</sup>

As Catholic priests voiced opposition to the transportation scheme

56 CSPI, iii, p. 296; Ailes, *Military Migration*, pp 10–11; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 29; Jansson and Rogozhin, *England and the North*, pp 49–50; Miller, *Swords for Hire*, pp 83–4; Edwards, 'Legacy', p. 294.

57 Connolly, *Contested island*, p. 277; McCavitt, *Flight*, p. 157.

58 *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in other Libraries of Northern Italy*, vol. 11 (1607–1610) (London, 1904), p. 278.

59 Ailes, 'From British Mercenaries to Swedish Nobles', pp 31–2; CSPI, iii, p. 305.

60 CSPI, iii, pp 264, 271; Fitzsimon, 'Irish Swordsmen', p. 23; Connolly, *Contested island*, p. 277; Lenman, *England's Colonial Wars*, p. 165.

61 NA, PRO, SP 95 (Sweden), pt. 1, f. 162, William Stewart to Robert Cecil, 4 April 1610.

and dark rumours circulated about its purpose, recruiters began to have difficulty finding volunteers.<sup>62</sup> The lord deputy's correspondence with London reveals that the dream of the swift removal of thousands of 'idle swordsmen' quickly faded. In July 1609 Chichester wrote to the Privy Council suggesting that English captains be replaced with Irish commanders, thinking they would have better luck recruiting among their countrymen.<sup>63</sup> The king and the Privy Council shared the lord deputy's disappointment at the relatively low number of 'ill affected' soldiers being recruited.<sup>64</sup> As a result, sometime during the summer of 1609 a shift occurred in the operation of the transportation scheme. More or less voluntary recruiting gave way to increased coercion and the use of press-gangs. Although some Irish soldiers continued to volunteer, forced exile became the norm. Chichester zealously enforced the new policy, but from our reading of his correspondence it is not clear that he was its author. On the surface it appears that the king's chief minister, Robert Cecil (Earl of Salisbury) took the lead. Cecil feared a possible invasion of Ireland 'orchestrated by the lords of Ulster', and he took a number of measures to deal with that prospect.<sup>65</sup> One measure was to speed up the transportation of Irish soldiers to Sweden. On 23 July 1609 the Earl of Worcester relayed a message from King James to Cecil: 'For your project of Irish soldiers he doth exceedingly approve, together with your care of money and munition.' Cecil was given the go-ahead to carry out a new and unprecedented state-sponsored levy for Swedish service. Since Spens and the Stewart brothers were 'competitors' in levying troops in Ireland, James left it up to Cecil to choose whom to hire to recruit a new regiment of Irish soldiers.<sup>66</sup> On 3 August 1609 the Privy Council officially informed Chichester of the new policy:<sup>67</sup>

For they esteem it is a special good service, as well for the state of the kingdom as for the plantation, that as many of the native Irish as possible were vented out of the land. With this view His Majesty has resolved to send 1,000 men more to be levied in that land; and they (the lords) suggest that some of the gentlemen of the better sort, of their own nation, be chosen to be their commanders who by their love and credit amongst them will make the levying of them easier. The King will be at the charge of their transportation, and is willing that he (Chichester) shall disburse some

62 CPSI, iii, pp 251, 296.

63 CSPI, iii, pp 272, 296.

64 CSPI, iii, p. 264.

65 CMS, xxi, pp 72, 86-7, 97-8; McCavitt, *Flight*, p. 157; Lyons, 'Vagabonds', p. 366; H. McDonnell, *The Wild Geese of the Antrim MacDonnells* (Dublin, 1996), p. 24.

66 CMS, xxi, pp 92-3.

67 CSPI, iii, pp 264-5.



small sums to put them into some such clothing as may cover their nakedness, and only take away the mark of their miserable and barbarous condition, and that it be made of English fashion, but of country stuff, which they are informed is cheap; it being only to serve them at sea, for upon their arrival in Sweden they are to receive new apparel, and to be furnished with arms. They have already provided shipping, but it is detained in the river by contrary winds. They are to set sail in 14 days, if the wind serve, for the port of Derry. Besides this letter (which they send that he may have time to prepare) there will presently follow the commander of the regiment, Sir Robert Stewart, brother to the Earl of Orkney, His Majesty's near kinsman, or his brother.

The lord deputy immediately implemented the new policy and in the process found a solution to the problem of those stubborn rebel lords holding out in Ulster. It is possible that Chichester already had that in mind when he recommended the use of Irish recruiters in early July. In fact Chichester, rather than Cecil or King James, may have been the real author of the new policy.<sup>68</sup> He was in the best position to monitor recruitment and was anxious to get rid of 'idle swordsmen'. Indeed, the lord deputy was still actively hunting down rebels in February 1609 when the County of Armagh petitioned him to pardon 'the wood-kerne' or at least to allow them to depart for foreign military service. Chichester was initially opposed to the idea, fearing that it might allow the most notorious rebel chieftains to escape punishment.<sup>69</sup> Nevertheless, he gradually warmed to the notion of exiling those elusive troublemakers. By April 1609 Chichester heard rumors that Hugh O'Neill and the Army of Flanders (or at least the Regiment of Tyrone) planned to invade Ireland during summer 1609.<sup>70</sup> Chichester also received reports that the entire population of Ulster was ready to rebel upon the earl of Tyrone's return not so much because they loved 'The O'Neill' but because of their 'fear of being supplanted by the English'.<sup>71</sup> The lord deputy was constantly being warned about plots, and the archbishop of Armagh encouraged him to delay the Plantation of Ulster because of O'Neill's imminent return.<sup>72</sup> The lord deputy was quick-witted enough to recognize that a new policy, one that moved beyond voluntary transportation, was needed to avoid a potentially catastrophic uprising in Ulster.

Chichester was initially confident that the 1,000 men he was called

68 CSPI, iii, p. 270; J. McCavitt, 'Chichester, Ceannairc agus Cairlin.1609' in *Cuisle na nGael* (1986), pp 19–23; idem, *Flight*, pp 156–7; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 29.

69 CSPI, iii, pp 143, 196, 271–2; Connolly, *Contested island*, p. 277.

70 CSPI, iii, p. 196.

71 *Ibid.*

72 CSPI, iii, p. 299; Walsh, *An Exile of Ireland*, p. 93.

upon to raise for Swedish service could be levied more or less voluntarily in Connaught, Thomond, and Munster by using Irish captains. On 17 August 1609 the lord deputy wrote that he planned to seek out 'the most factious and stirring men to take the charge and command of the soldiers to be levied, who will soonest gather idlers together, and there will be a good riddance of them all when they are gone'.<sup>73</sup> Chichester requested that Robert Stewart's ships arrive as soon as possible, that they not all be anchored in one harbour, and that Sir Robert bring plenty of ready money to pay for recruitment expenses.<sup>74</sup> The initial cost estimate for raising 1,000 men was set at £2,125. That amount was determined by this calculation: the cost of transportation to port at ten shillings per soldier, victuals for thirty days at five pence per day per soldier, and outfitting them at twenty shillings per man with 'one cassock, one pair of hose, one pair of stockings, one pair of shoes, one shirt, [and] one cap'.<sup>75</sup>

From the outset, Chichester encountered resistance to his recruiting efforts. Irish priests and others denounced the levies as a plot to remove Irish soldiers on the eve of O'Neill's return or to drown all Irishmen foolish enough to sign up. Jesuits argued that it was a sin for Catholics to serve the usurper Karl IX.<sup>76</sup> As a result, relatively few soldiers volunteered, and many (especially in Ulster) hid out in the woods, bogs, and mountains.<sup>77</sup> To his surprise, Chichester discovered that most Irish soldiers (and especially Ulstermen) were reluctant to recognize one of their own peers as their commander, preferring to serve under well-known and respected English officers.<sup>78</sup> The lord deputy quickly located three English officers (Captains Maisteron, Sanford, and Throgmorton) who were willing to recruit companies of Irish soldiers in the counties of Tyrone, Armagh, and Monaghan and lead those men into Swedish service.<sup>79</sup> These captains were expected to use their own money to pay for recruiting and then to submit expense accounts to the government. Captain Gabriel Throgmorton, for example, recruited 143 soldiers over the course of a month and received a reimbursement of £800.<sup>80</sup> From mid-1609 to mid-1610 the English Exchequer paid out at least £5,775 for expenses associated with Irish levies for Sweden. That impressive figure is less than the actual overall cost because of chaotic and incomplete reporting and because recruiting expenses were reim-

73 CPSI, iii, pp 271-2.

74 CPSI, iii, pp 287, 296; IMC, p. 41.

75 CSPI, iii, p. 263; O'Meagher, *Some Historical Notices*, p. 55.

76 CPSI, iii, pp 296, 300.

77 CSPI, iii, pp 272, 290, 296; Bourke, 'Irish levies', pp 397-400; Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, p. 51; IMC, p. 107; McCavitt, *Flight*, pp 157-8, 160; Bonner, *That Audacious Traitor*, p. 208; Walsh, *Destruction by Peace*, p. 347.

78 CSPI, iii, p. 305. The preference for non-Irish officers is well documented in this case even though it appears counter-intuitive to some scholars; see, for example, Murdoch, 'The Northern Flight', p. 91.

79 CSPI, iii, pp 296, 305; Hill, *An historical account*, p. 253 n.119.

80 Devon, *Issues of the Exchequer*, p. 102; CMS, xxi, pp 200-01.



bursed not only from the English and Irish Exchequers but also from the confiscated assets of Hugh O'Neill and other rebel lords.<sup>81</sup>

Chichester became actively involved in recruiting, and as he encountered resistance the 'mask' of voluntary recruitment slipped off. By early September 1609 compulsory levies by press-gang became the norm.<sup>82</sup> Chichester also opened the jails and granted pardons to more than a thousand men who had participated in O'Doherty's Rebellion or were adherents of Hugh O'Neill. Almost no executions were carried out that season; instead, 'enforced enlistment' was imposed wholesale. Banishment included a stern warning that execution awaited any pardoned soldier foolish enough to return to Ireland.<sup>83</sup> Chichester personally focused on cleansing Ulster of as many swordsmen as possible. He started by rounding up stray soldiers and rebel clansmen in Inishowen (heartland of the O'Doherty rebellion). Many of the young men went sullenly; others had to be lodged in jail for weeks to keep them from running away.<sup>84</sup> By the time the troop ships departed for Sweden approximately 900 of the soldiers aboard were Ulstermen.<sup>85</sup> So successful was Chichester's heavy-handed recruitment that by late September he was being praised for lending a helping hand to the plantation and for having 'left the province of Ulster in more complete peace and obedience than has ever been seen since the Conquest'.<sup>86</sup> Even so, there were still an estimated 4,000 Irish soldiers left in Ulster and 12,000 left in Ireland. Fear of those potential rebels led to calls to exile thousands more of them even before the men pressed into service during the autumn of 1609 had departed for Sweden.<sup>87</sup>

The first wave of the autumn recruits for Swedish service made their way to four ships, three anchored in Derry harbour (convenient for Ulster recruitment) and one in Carlingford Lough (near Newry). While Colonel Robert Stewart coordinated recruitment in Derry, the lord deputy went to Carlingford Lough to supervise the granting of pardons and ensure that all the reluctant recruits boarded ship. Chichester took the precaution of concentrating military forces from several nearby garrisons at Carlingford as hundreds of Irish soldiers were pardoned and immediately exiled. Chichester has been accused of sending 'the cream of the manhood of Ulster' to Sweden, but in his eyes these were all 'cruel, wild malefactors

81 Gardiner, *History of England*, ii, p. 420; Nichols, *Topographer*, pp 90-1.

82 McCavitt, *Flight*, pp 157-8; Edwards, 'Legacy', p. 294; Fitzsimon, 'Irish Swordsmen', p. 23; Henry, 'Ulster Exiles', pp 43-4.

83 CSPI, iii, pp 292-3; Harris, 'Rebellion', p. 299; Hill, *An historical account*, p. 189; Bonner, *That Audacious Traitor*, pp 207-08, 264-5, 267-70; Henry, 'Ulster Exiles', pp 44-5; M. Walsh, 'The Last Years of Hugh O'Neill: Rome, 1608-1616' in *The Irish Sword*, viii (1967-68), p. 230; idem, *Destruction by Peace*, pp 300-01; Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers', p. 200.

84 CSPI, iii, p. 304; Nichols, *Topographer*, pp 90-1

85 CSPI, iii, p. 304; McGurk, 'Wild Geese', p. 42; McCavitt, *Flight*, p. 158.

86 CSPI, iii, pp 292, 303-04.

87 CSPI, iii, p. 296.

[and] thieves'. The lord deputy personally assisted in pushing reluctant soldiers aboard 'full against their wills'.<sup>88</sup> Not surprisingly, a mutiny broke out aboard the half-filled ship in Carlingford Lough, during which the ship's compass was broken and Captain John Throgmorton and several English sailors were threatened. Quick thinking and the enlistment of all available men and ships allowed Chichester to suppress the uprising within twenty-four hours. Several of the ringleaders were put to death.<sup>89</sup>

Soon after the mutiny, Chichester succeeded in getting the remaining half dozen most important rebel Gaelic lords – the 'notablest outlaws upon all the borders' – to come forward and agree to banishment as captains of companies of their own kinsmen. Hugh O'Neill claimed that 1,200 of his kinsmen and vassals were among those exiled to Sweden in 1609.<sup>90</sup> The lord deputy's willingness to allow men such as Oghy O'Hanlon, who had long eluded him, to escape punishment shows just how important the transportation scheme was to the government and its plantation plans. Oghy O'Hanlon was Hugh O'Neill's nephew and played a leading role in O'Doherty's Rebellion. He was described at the time of his exile as a man 'of a malicious, stubborn, mutinous disposition, and without a doubt a traitor in his heart' who 'will be ready to undertake any mischief'. Why did O'Hanlon and other leading Gaelic aristocrats come out of hiding and agree to leave Ireland? It has been plausibly suggested that they feared Chichester's efforts to capture and punish them and came to prefer exile to their increasingly likely detention. But did they really volunteer, as some have suggested? It seems more likely that they had no real choice in the matter.<sup>91</sup> As a principal rebel leader, Oghy O'Hanlon had been stripped of his inheritance by Chichester, and he may have been taken into protective custody before his exile to Sweden. O'Hanlon was pressed into Swedish military service and threatened with execution if he resisted.<sup>92</sup> Exile was to be permanent, with no hope of return. When O'Hanlon departed from Ireland, he took 50 kinsmen and vassals with him and possibly some O'Hanlon women as well.<sup>93</sup> Oghy O'Hanlon may not have intended to return to Ireland, but his own choice of final destination was almost certainly not Sweden. Many exiled Irishmen he probably hoped to

88 CSPI, iii, p. 296; Bonner, *That Audacious Traitor*, pp 207-08, 264-5; Harris, 'Rebellion', pp 299, 303-04; McCavitt, 'Chichester', pp 19-23.

89 CSPI, iii, pp 304, 334; Edwards, 'Legacy', p. 294.

90 Walsh, *Destruction by Peace*, pp 286, 300-01; idem, 'The Last Years of Hugh O'Neill: Rome, 1608-1616' in *The Irish Sword*, vii (1965-66), p. 336.

91 CSPI, iii, pp 304-06; Harris, 'Rebellion', p. 325; IMC, pp 41, 71; McCavitt, *Flight*, pp 157-8; Bourke, 'Irish Levies', p. 398.

92 Canny, *Making Ireland British*, pp 190-1; McCavitt, 'Chichester', pp 19-23; Harris, 'Rebellion', pp 299, 325; Henry, 'Ulster Exiles', pp 43-4; Jennings, *Wild Geese*, p. 557 n.610.

93 CSPI, iii, p. 305; IMC, pp 71, 107. On women aboard the troop ships, see *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of James I* (4 vols, London, 1857-59) [hereafter cited as CPJ], i, p. 564.



escape from the ships bound for Sweden and to make their way either to Hugh O'Neill in Rome or to the Netherlands to enlist in the Regiment of Tyrone.<sup>94</sup>

In late October 1609, under the overall command of Colonel Robert Stewart, the 'Sea Flower' of London and two other ships with 800 Irish soldiers aboard departed from Derry for Sweden. In early November the ship in Carlingford Lough departed for Sweden with about 300 Irish soldiers aboard.<sup>95</sup> Recruiting for the autumn levies had taken longer than anticipated; and, as a result, the ships sailed into stormy weather and rough seas. Before reaching the Danish Sound strong easterly winds (what might be described as a Catholic Breeze) forced all four ships to seek shelter on the east coast of England and Scotland. They were scattered from the Thames estuary to northern Scotland. On 1 December 1609 King James issued orders for the care and feeding of the stranded Irish soldiers until they could depart for Sweden, but he warned that care be taken to prevent the men from doing any harm.<sup>96</sup> It was decided to let them remain in England until early 1610, but the potential cost of feeding so many soldiers in the greater London area led to fleeting thoughts of having the soldiers spend the winter in less expensive Brandenburg. The concentration of Irish soldiers in southeastern England did not go unnoticed, nor did rumors that they might be moved to the Continent. Although unaware of James's agreement with Karl IX, Sigismund III feared the soldiers might be used in a plot to topple him from the Polish throne. Sigismund suspected that James was conspiring with the powerful Lithuanian Prince Janusz Radziwill.<sup>97</sup>

In late November 1609 one of the ships from Derry with 300 Irish soldiers aboard found a safe haven in Harwich harbour.<sup>98</sup> Another ship from Derry under the command of Captain John Throgmorton anchored at the port of Tilbury (located at the mouth of the Thames). Soldiers from both ships immediately spread out over southeast England and 'pestered' the natives, mostly by stealing food (including '30 or 40 muttens').<sup>99</sup> Not surprisingly, many of the men refused to re-board the ships, and efforts to round them up were only partially successful. Captain Throgmorton soon found himself fending off charges of negligence and involvement in a plot to let the soldiers escape. In addition, the men who returned to Throgmorton's ship continued to cause trouble. On 16 February 1610 Sir Thomas Phillips filed this report about a mutiny in Tilbury harbour:<sup>100</sup>

94 Walsh, 'Destruction by peace', pp 97–8, 286, 300–01; IMC pp 11–12, 192–4.

95 CSPI, iii, p. 304; Edwards, 'Legacy', p. 294; B. Jennings (ed), *Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders 1582–1700* (Dublin, 1964), p. 557 n.610; McCavitt, *Flight*, p. 158.

96 CMS, xxi, pp 162–3; CPJ, i, pp 567, 580.

97 J. Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic trade in the early seventeenth century: A Study in Anglo – Polish commercial diplomacy* (Cambridge, 1980), p. 139.

98 CPJ, i, pp 563, 580.

99 CMS, xxi, pp 200–02.

100 McCavitt, *Flight*, pp 158–9.

At my coming to the ship, I found the captain, master and marrines kept aboard by the Irish soldiers, who would not permit them to go ashore. The soldiers said it was to the end that Captain Throgmorton should not go ashore to hinder them of their due, which they allege they have not received to the full of 8d a day; besides they complain of the weights of their victuals and measure of beer. Also the cloth whereof the trowses were made was so bad they hurled some 3 or 4 pair over the ship's side for me to see. After parley I caused them to hoist out the boat, that the captain, master and 3 or 4 of the ringleaders should come ashore. On examination, having the victualler with me, the captain clears himself, but affirms that they are short of their shortes, some 150, and that some of the cloth was naught, and that they have not victuals for above 10 days. I send this letter by the victualler, Somerland, that they may be supplied of their wants and victuals for 12 days more, which if presently supplied the master will set sail forthwith. I have sent into the country to inquire further of their misdemeanours, to the end that the principal offenders being found, both of that disorder and this mutiny, I might take a course for their punishment.

Farther up the coast, in late November the ship from Carlingford Lough commanded by Captain Thomas Lichfield (with approximately 300 Irish soldiers aboard) sought shelter at Newcastle-upon-Tyne. A report sent to Robert Cecil noted that the ship at Newcastle and the two ships in the Thames estuary carried a very precious cargo, a total of 'fourscore and ten women'.<sup>101</sup> The status of those women remains a mystery, and it is unknown if any of them stayed with the soldiers who entered Swedish service. In mid-December 1609 Cecil received assurances from Sir William Stewart that the ship at Newcastle was ready to sail as soon as weather permitted. Stewart tried to make amends by sending Cecil a gift: the dogs confiscated from the exiled Irish lords.<sup>102</sup> As it turned out, the ship anchored at Newcastle did not depart in December. Instead, Captain Lichfield reported that many of the soldiers had escaped. The ringleader of those 'most wicked and ungodly creatures' was the earl of Tyrone's half-brother, Hugh Boy O'Neill, described by Lichfield as 'a branch of an ill tree'. Departure from Newcastle was further delayed by the icing up of the Tyne River, but on 2 February 1610 the ship finally 'sailed with a fair wind'.<sup>103</sup>

The fourth troop ship had been forced by bad weather ('contrarious

101 CPJ, i, p. 564.

102 CMS, xxi, p. 168.

103 CPJ, i, p. 585; CSPI, iii, p. 334; Fitzsimon, 'Irish Swordsmen', p. 23; Jennings, *Wild Geese*, p. 557 n.610.



windes') to seek shelter at Peterhead on the northeastern coast of Scotland. The Scottish government was quick to assume responsibility for feeding the soldiers and ordered them 'on pain of death' not to try to escape. That did not stop most of the men from moving inland and south in search of food. A number of them made their way to Fife ('Fyff'). Many of the men made it to Edinburgh where some of them tried to hide from the authorities. Others attempted to return home. Mariners on Scotland's west coast were sternly warned not to ferry the 'fugitive Yrismen' back to Ireland. Eventually, the ship anchored at Peterhead departed for Sweden but with significantly fewer soldiers aboard than it had when it left Derry.<sup>104</sup>

Overall, the autumn 1609 forced levies proved to be a disaster. Hundreds of Irish soldiers and several important Gaelic lords escaped, in the process frightening and molesting civilians all the way from Fife to Kent. About a quarter of those soldiers eventually made their way to the Netherlands and joined the Army of Flanders; Oghy O'Hanlon, for example, became a captain in the Regiment of Tyrone.<sup>105</sup> One scholar estimated that O'Hanlon and others orchestrated the escape of up to a thousand Irish soldiers.<sup>106</sup> That number is inaccurate; more than half of the 1100 men on those four ships made it to Sweden. Nevertheless, recruitment by press-gang in 1609 inadvertently added hundreds of Irishmen to the Army of Flanders. That fact, disturbing for the Irish government, reinforced concerns expressed by Lord Deputy Chichester and others about the unreliability of Irish soldiers.<sup>107</sup> Nevertheless, the desire to rid Ulster and Ireland of 'idle swordsmen' was so strong that plans for recruiting in 1610 began as soon as the ships left Ireland in the autumn of 1609. Chichester was deeply involved. On 31 October 1609 he wrote to the Privy Council stating that in the future the lord deputy should be allowed to choose commanders who were popular among the Irish themselves; 'otherwise it will require a greater stir and compulsion than is fit to be often experimented and repeated'.<sup>108</sup>

In early 1610 Chichester advised Cecil to consider sending Irish soldiers to 'be employed in the service of Russia rather than that of Sweden'.<sup>109</sup> Popular resistance to the Swedish levies had been strong in 1609, and there was no sign that opposition was waning. The lord deputy was keenly aware that Irish soldiers did not wish to serve the king of Sweden.<sup>110</sup> To

104 *The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland*, vol. 8 [1607-1610] (Edinburgh, 1887), pp 390, 393; Miller, *Swords for Hire*, p. 12; Edwards, 'Legacy', p. 294; McCavitt, *Flight*, pp 159-60.

105 IMC, pp 71, 107, 112; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 29; R. Bagwell, *Ireland under the Stuarts and during the Interregnum* (3 vols, London, 1963), i, p. 98.

106 Silke, 'The Irish Abroad', p. 593.

107 TNA, PRO, SP 95 (Sweden), pt. 1, f. 156, Andrew Greep to Robert Cecil, 28 July 1609; McCavitt, *Flight*, p. 159.

108 CSPI, iii, p. 305.

109 CSPI, iii, p. 371.

110 CSPI, iii, p. 272.

no one's surprise, Chichester's advice was ignored. In April 1610 Karl IX reaffirmed Richard Bingley's commission to recruit 1,000 Irish soldiers from Connaught that summer.<sup>111</sup> In June 1610, the Privy Council informed the lord deputy of a slightly revised plan:<sup>112</sup>

Although His Majesty might be diverted from a renewal of his design to send companies of Irish out of Ireland into Sweden, in consequence of the ill carriage of the transportation attempted last year, when by negligence of the conductors and the contrary winds, the Irish were brought back again and landed in several places and counties of this kingdom, yet, considering how much the venting of the Irish swordsmen out of Ulster concerns the peace of that province and the furtherance of the plantation, he is resolved to make another trial and to send 600 to Sweden, under the command of Captain Richard Bingley, the bearer of this letter. In order to regulate the cost, Captain Bingley has entered into articles with His Majesty, regulating the charge of victualling, clothing, and transporting, of these companies from the time they shall be delivered at the sea-side till they come to be landed in Sweden.

The Privy Council agreed to pay all costs of feeding the 600 recruits until they arrived at port and then to pay five pence per day per soldier until the ships reached Sweden. The Council also agreed to pay Bingley twenty shillings per soldier for clothing and offered him a bonus of ten shillings for each man delivered to Sweden. The budget to facilitate the 600-man levy was set at £1,287. The Privy Council specified that the recruits were to be 'mere Irish (except for some of their commanders) and especially active Irish; and what shall be wanting of the number in Ulster may be taken from the other provinces'. The Council ordered the troop ships to sail north on their way to Sweden (staying west of Scotland) and to avoid landing anywhere in either Scotland or England. Finally, the Council cautioned against concentrating ships in one port. Anchoring three ships in Derry harbour for many weeks in 1609 had apparently produced serious price inflation that left hard feeling both among the soldiers and the local population.<sup>113</sup>

Captain Bingley recruited actively during the summer of 1610. He found some volunteers in Munster and Connaught, but recruiting was slow, especially in Ulster. Just as in 1609, Irish priests and other 'ill spirits' spread wild tales that caused many 'idle and able men' to hide out in the

<sup>111</sup> TNA, PRO, SP 95 (Sweden), pt. 1, f. 162, William Stewart to Robert Cecil, 4 April 1610; TNA, PRO, SP 95 (Sweden), pt. 1, f. 166, Thomas Lichfield to Robert Cecil, 6 April 1610.

<sup>112</sup> CSPI, iii, pp 458-9; Connolly, *Contested island*, p. 277.

<sup>113</sup> CSPI, iii, pp 459-60.



woods. And just as in 1609, Chichester was encouraged to take a tough line with the Irish as rumors swirled about the imminent return of Hugh O'Neill.<sup>114</sup> The lord deputy responded to slow recruiting by ordering the use of press-gangs to levy troops. As in 1609, dozens of men were jailed to prevent them from escaping transportation to Sweden. Although the recruits were supposed to be 'mere' Irishmen, in the chaos of impressment several English pirates ended up being shipped to Sweden. With great effort Chichester was able to round up 200 men 'of the worst sort' in Ulster.<sup>115</sup> The historian Pádraig Lenihan hardly exaggerated when he wrote that in 1610 the lord deputy resorted to terror tactics to rid Ireland of undesirables.<sup>116</sup> It is worth noting that a pamphlet appeared in London at about this time, Thomas Blenerhasset's *A direction for the plantation in Ulster*, in which the author (who received 500 acres in the plantation and acquired 2,000 more), explicitly advocated the use of terror against the 'cruell wood-kerne' and even encouraged hunting them for sport.<sup>117</sup>

Chichester may have cleansed Ireland of 'idle swordsmen', but he left a surprisingly sophisticated and sympathetic assessment of why the Irish stubbornly resisted recruitment. In September 1610 he acknowledged that the 'continual fear of constraint into that employment does no less discontent and perplex the people of Ulster than this late distribution of escheated lands and new population of the country'. He noted that many Irishmen were still counting on Hugh O'Neill to launch an invasion or at least 'to send them arms and munition wherewith to arm themselves against the plantation: for they will rather die than be removed to the small proportions assigned to them, or seek a new dwelling in other countries'.<sup>118</sup>

By September Bingley succeeded in raising a levy of well over 600 men for Swedish military service. Unlike the previous year, in 1610 only one ship got into trouble. It ran aground on the Isle of Man and all aboard were in danger of drowning. The heroism of a Scottish sailor prevented any loss of life, and the captain had sufficient funds to hire another ship and resume the voyage to Sweden.<sup>119</sup> According to a reliable Swedish source, Bingley managed to deliver 700 Irish soldiers by early November.<sup>120</sup>

Due to Captain Bingley's contract, most costs associated with the 1610 levies were incurred by the government during the early summer and were therefore included in the 1609-1610 reimbursements from the English

114 CSPI, iii, pp 474, 496.

115 CSPI, iii, p. 496; McCavitt, *Flight*, p. 160; Hill, *An historical account*, p. 253 n.119; O'Meagher, *Some Historical Notices*, p. 55.

116 Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, pp 49-51.

117 T. Blenerhasset, *A direction for the plantation in Ulster* (London, 1610), p. B2; Hill, *An historical account*, pp 277, 489-90.

118 CSPI, iii, pp 496, 503.

119 CSPI, iii, pp 496-7; Ailes, *Military Migration*, pp 11-12; Fitzsimon, 'Irish Swordsmen', p. 23.

120 TNA, PRO, SP 95 (Sweden), pt. 1, f. 177, James Spens to Robert Cecil, 8 November 1610.

Exchequer, which totalled £5775. As in 1609, some expenses were also paid from the confiscated property of Gaelic lords.<sup>121</sup> Increasing resistance and declining enthusiasm for the transportation scheme led the British government to scale back its efforts. In 1611 the English Exchequer paid out only £192 to send Irish soldiers to Sweden.<sup>122</sup> That low figure does not mean that few Irish soldiers were levied in 1611. Even as the British grew weary of the forced levies, Karl IX became more enthusiastic about hiring Irish soldiers. The Swedes had a high opinion of Irish soldiers but were concerned about their reliability in any war against a Catholic monarch. In spite of such misgivings, Karl sent an embassy to King James in July 1610 requesting permission to recruit many more soldiers.<sup>123</sup> Once Captain Bingley's 700 men reached Sweden in early November 1610, Swedish military forces contained at least 2,000 Irishmen, many of them fighting in northwest Russia.<sup>124</sup> At that point Karl's principal military recruiter, Sir James Spens, sent a letter to Robert Cecil offering to hire up to 2,000 more Irish soldiers without asking King James to subsidize the levies.<sup>125</sup>

It is not known how many Irish soldiers were transported to Sweden or Narva in 1611. There were still thousands of 'idle swordsmen' in Ireland, and the threat of invasion by the Army of Flanders had not eased.<sup>126</sup> Many of the same Britons were involved in recruiting as in the two previous years. For example, Sir William Stewart and Captains Lichfield and Sanford continued to levy troops in Ireland.<sup>127</sup> Mr. William Stallenge continued to act as the transportation scheme's paymaster and 'auditor of imprest'.<sup>128</sup> There was a marked decline in recruiting expenses in 1611 – only £192 in the first half of the year, then falling to zero.<sup>129</sup> But that tells us nothing about the number of Irish soldiers transported to Sweden in this period

121 Gardiner, *History of England*, ii, p. 420; Nichols, *Topographer*, pp 90–91; Hill, *An historical account*, p. 253 n.19.

122 CPJ, i, p. 29; Gardiner, *History of England*, ii, p. 420.

123 TNA, PRO, SP 95 (Sweden), pt. 1, f. 166, Thomas Lichfield to Robert Cecil, 6 April 1610; McCavitt, *Flight*, p. 161; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 29; Jansson and Rogozhin, *England and the North*, pp 51–2.

124 The 1609 voluntary levies raised at least 700 men, and the forced levies another 1,100. That means at least 1,800 soldiers left Ireland for Sweden during the first year of the transportation scheme. Taking into account significant losses en route, about 1,300 Irish soldiers joined Swedish service before Bingley's additional 700 men arrived in late 1610. See TNA, PRO, SP 95 (Sweden), pt. 1, ff 170–1, James Spens to Robert Cecil, 30 September 1610; Ailes, *Military Migration*, p. 12; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp 30–1. The erroneous claim that there were 2,200 Irish soldiers in Swedish service before Bingley's arrival (Jansson and Rogozhin, *England and the North*, p. 50) was probably based on a misreading of Spens's letter to Cecil; see Murdoch, 'The Northern Flight', p. 91; Murdoch and Grosjean, 'Irish Soldiers', p. 162.

125 TNA, PRO, SP 95 (Sweden), pt. 1, f. 177, James Spens to Robert Cecil, 8 November 1610.

126 CMS, xxi, p. 307.

127 TNA, PRO, SP 91 (Russia), pt. 1, f. 222, William Stewart to Robert Cecil, 17 August 1611; Borowy, 'Anglicy, Szkoci i Irlandczycy', p. 298.

128 Devon, *Issues of the Exchequer*, p. 102; CMS, xxi, p. 201; CPJ, i, p. 29; CPJ ii, p. 29.

129 Gardiner, *History of England*, ii, p. 420.



because active Swedish-sponsored recruiting (mostly by Scottish captains) continued but without subvention from King James.<sup>130</sup> In 1612 James lost interest in sending Irish soldiers to Sweden, but Karl continued to acquire small numbers levied by independent Scottish recruiters such as Captain Gilbert Wauchop.<sup>131</sup> In August 1612 Chichester wrote that there were still plenty of 'lewd Kerns or such as have bin Rebels or are idle Livers' available for impressment, but he warned that at the approach of a press-gang those men quickly 'betake themselves to the Woods or obscure mountains from whence it is hard to fetch them'.<sup>132</sup>

During the winter of 1612–13, officials of the Russia Company (the English joint-stock company that monopolized Anglo-Russian trade) approached King James with a project to establish a protectorate over north Russia in order to preserve that war-torn and leaderless realm from being conquered by Sweden or Poland-Lithuania. James became enthusiastic about the 'project touching Moscovia' and sent an embassy to Archangel in the spring of 1613 to determine if it was still feasible. It was not. By then Mikhail Romanov had been elected tsar, and the Russians no longer had any interest in a British protector.<sup>133</sup> Nevertheless, during the time James was actively interested in the project several military officers made plans for intervention in north Russia.<sup>134</sup> Not surprisingly, the use of Irish soldiers was considered. In the spring of 1613, Sir Fulke Conway sent a proposal to Archbishop George Abbot suggesting the recruitment of several thousand Irish soldiers to sail to north Russia and lay siege to the Solovetskii Monastery, reputed to be the richest place in the world. Based on first-hand experience, Conway described how to recruit Irishmen for military service in Russia – provide them with plenty of food and beer.<sup>135</sup>

Chichester claimed to have sent away to Sweden 6,000 'bad and disloyal' Irish soldiers during the period 1609–13. That is a somewhat high estimate.<sup>136</sup> The actual number may have been closer to 5,000. About half of those unfortunate souls were banished against their will, and very few returned to Ireland. Instead, they died or made new lives for themselves

130 Borowy, 'Anglicy, Szkoci i Irlandczycy', p. 300; Miller, *Swords for Hire*, p. 87.

131 Ailes, 'From British Mercenaries to Swedish Nobles', pp 32–4; Edwards, 'Legacy', p. 294; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp 25, 29–31; Fischer, *The Scots in Sweden*, pp 72, 223–4.

132 A. Chichester, 'Letter-Book of Sir Arthur Chichester, 1612–1614', in *Analecta Hibernica* viii (1938), pp 40–1.

133 C. Dunning, 'A "Singular Affection" for Russia: Why King James Offered to Intervene in the Time of Troubles' in *Russian History* xxxiv, 1–4 (2007), pp 277–302.

134 C. Dunning, 'A Letter to James I concerning the English Plan for Military Intervention in Russia', in *The Slavonic and East European Review*, lxvii, 1 (1989), pp 84–108; idem, 'Singular Affection', pp 294–6. Murdoch ('Diplomacy', p. 96) incorrectly claimed that King James declined the Russia Company proposal to annex north Russia.

135 TNA, PRO, SP 91 (Russia), pt. 1, f. 250v, Fulke Conway to George Abbot, spring 1613; Dunning, 'The Richest Place in the World', pp 323–5.

136 CSPI, iv, p. 480; Henry, 'Wild Geese', p. 190; McCavitt, *Flight*, p. 160; Murdoch and Grosjean, 'Irish Soldiers', p. 161.

in foreign lands. Of course not all of the soldiers leaving Ireland arrived in Sweden. Overall losses along the way exceeded ten per cent and may have been as high as 20%. Hundreds of Irish soldiers escaped en route to Sweden, most of them migrating to the Spanish Netherlands and a handful risking execution by returning to Ireland.<sup>137</sup> According to Murdoch and Grosjean, the total number of Irish soldiers entering Swedish service during the period 1609-13 'was between one and two thousand'.<sup>138</sup> That low estimate may need revision. In fact, it is extremely difficult to determine the number of Irishmen who entered Swedish military forces during the early seventeenth century. The main problem is that many Irish soldiers were mistakenly identified as Scottish soldiers.<sup>139</sup> Irish soldiers were also frequently misidentified as Englishmen.<sup>140</sup> Another problem is the lack of documentation for many of the smaller levies, especially after 1610. By then the British government had lost interest in keeping close tabs on those men because it no longer subsidized their transportation to Sweden, but the Swedes continued to recruit Irish soldiers, often without notifying Dublin.

Prior to 1609 few Irish soldiers served in Sweden, but starting in that year numbers of Irishmen began appearing in Swedish military records. At least 1,800 Irish soldiers left Ireland as a result of the 1609 levies, and approximately 1,300 of those men made it to Sweden. In 1610 at least 700 more Irish soldiers arrived in Sweden. As a result, the number of Irish soldiers in Swedish military service probably peaked in late 1610 at no fewer than 2,000. After that the total number in service may have gradually declined, but hundreds of Irishmen continued to enter Swedish military service, and the Swedes kept requesting thousands more of them. A reasonable estimate of the number of Irish soldiers entering Swedish service during the period 1609-13 is 3,500; the actual number may have been higher.<sup>141</sup>

Upon arrival in Stockholm or the Swedish fortress of Narva in Livonia, Irish soldiers were assessed, outfitted, armed, and integrated into Scottish or English regiments. Living conditions were very poor, and the men often went hungry. They were also routinely cheated out of their wages by greedy officers.<sup>142</sup> Most companies of Irish soldiers maintained their separate

<sup>137</sup> Bonner, *That Audacious Traitor*, pp 210, 266; Edwards, 'Legacy', p. 293; Ailes, *Military Migration*, p. 77; Silke, 'The Irish Abroad', p. 593.

<sup>138</sup> Murdoch and Grosjean, 'Irish Soldiers', p. 163.

<sup>139</sup> H. Almquist, *Sverige och Ryssland 1595-1611* (Uppsala, 1907), p. 142; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp 30-1.

<sup>140</sup> Murdoch and Grosjean, 'Irish Soldiers', p. 163; Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers', p. 207.

<sup>141</sup> In addition to undocumented Swedish levies and the chronic problem of misidentifying Irish soldiers as Britons, there are levies mentioned in British sources but without any information about the number of Irishmen recruited (e.g., Captain Throgmorton's first 1609 levy, levies in 1611 by Captains Lichfield and Sanford, and the 1612 levy by Captain Wauchop).

<sup>142</sup> S. Purchas, *Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimes* (20 vols, Glasgow, 1905-07).



identity and strong unit cohesion. They demanded to hear Catholic mass, and hidden in their ranks were priests dressed as soldiers who acted as spies for Spanish authorities and secretly encouraged the men to desert or to switch sides and fight for the king of Poland-Lithuania.<sup>143</sup> Under the influence of the priests, many Irish soldiers abandoned Karl IX's service.<sup>144</sup> The Polish army offered them a safe haven, and Polish generals tried to entice them away from Swedish service.<sup>145</sup> In 1609, following a successful but long and bloody campaign, many mercenaries in Swedish forces (including Irishmen) rebelled against greedy commanders who had stolen their wages. Those soldiers abandoned Swedish service altogether, pillaging villages as they departed.<sup>146</sup> In the spring of 1610, approximately 500 English and 300 Irish soldiers stationed near Narva were enticed into switching sides by the 'secret stratagems and negotiations' of the Polish commander Alexander Lisowski.<sup>147</sup>

In June 1610, Irish soldiers in a large Swedish-Russian army (30,000 men) fought against fellow Irishmen serving in a much smaller Polish army (7,000 men) at the decisive battle of Klushino. During that battle approximately 1,500 West European soldiers in Swedish service (including hundreds of Irishmen) switched sides, thereby assuring the Poles of victory – one of the most memorable in Polish history.<sup>148</sup> That victory triggered the overthrow of Tsar Vasiliï Shuiskii and led directly to the Polish occupation of Moscow and the acceptance by many Russian lords of Sigismund III's son, Prince Wladyslaw, as the new tsar. Russian historians have often accused the mercenary soldiers of betraying Tsar Vasiliï.<sup>149</sup> That may not be an entirely fair judgment. Those men had been forced to march for hundreds of miles and to fight without pay, which was withheld by officers hoping battlefield casualties would reduce the number of men seeking back wages.<sup>150</sup> Despite serious grievances, the mercenaries performed well

xiv, pp 213–17; I. Lubimenko, 'A Project for the Acquisition of Russia by James I', in *English Historical Review*, xxix, 114 (April 1914), pp 246–7; Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers', p. 204; Ailes, *Military Migration*, p. 24; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp 29–30, 145–6; Fischer, *The Scots in Sweden*, p. 73.

143 CSPI, iv, pp 184–5; McCavitt, *Flight*, pp 160–1; McGurk, 'Wild Geese', pp 41–2.

144 Fitzsimon, 'Irish Swordsmen', p. 23; IMC, p. 107; Bonner, *That Audacious Traitor*, p. 209.

145 Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers', p. 200; Jansson and Rogozhin, *England and the North*, pp 50–1; Ailes, *Military Migration*, p. 27.

146 Dunning, *Russia's First Civil War*, p. 402.

147 C. Bussow, *The Disturbed State of the Russian Realm* (Montreal, 1994), p. 125; G. Zhordaniia, *Ocherki iz istorii franko-russkikh otnoshenii kontsa XVI i pervoi polovine XVII v.* (2 vols, Tbilisi, 1959), i, p. 263.

148 H. Brereton, *News of the Present Misery of Russia* (London, 1614), pp 53–4; Zhordaniia, *Ocherki*, i, p. 263; Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers', pp 199–200; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 30.

149 S. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen* (15 vols, Moscow, 1959–66), iv, pp 569–71; Zhordaniia, *Ocherki*, i, p. 266.

150 S. Zolkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow* (London, 1959), p. 77; R. Skrynnikov, *The Time of Troubles: Russia in Crisis 1604–1618* (Gulf Breeze, FL, 1988), p. 88; B. Floria, *Polsko-litovskaia interventsiiia v Rossii i russkoe obshchestvo* (Moscow, 2005), p. 167.

during the battle of Klushino, stoutly resisting Polish assaults while suffering heavy casualties. But when both of their generals disappeared from the battlefield and Russian soldiers began to retreat in disorder, French and Scottish mercenaries sent an offer to parlay with the Polish commander Stanislaw Zolkiewski, who had been trying for days to pry those men loose from Swedish service. Zolkiewski immediately offered generous terms of surrender.<sup>151</sup> He gave the mercenaries two options: join the Polish army or receive safe passage out of the country. Some Irishmen chose to depart for the west, hoping to join the Army of Flanders.<sup>152</sup>

Most Irish soldiers who surrendered at Klushino chose to join the Polish army. According to Hugh O'Neill, at least seven companies of them made that decision, including some of his own kinsmen and vassals.<sup>153</sup> Among the Irish soldiers joining the Polish army were hundreds from Ulster, including veterans of Kinsale and O'Doherty's Rebellion. Thomas Chamberlayne, a British captain who surrendered at Klushino, wrote to Robert Cecil about them:<sup>154</sup>

Theare weare tooe hundered of those Ulster Kernishe Rebels which came over with Captayne Bingly when he came into Sweden. Soe uppon the overthrowe [surrender at Klushino], theare wear some fowerscore of them that redusced themselves into a Company and made choyse of one George Bingly, a Bastarde sonne unto John Bingly the teller of the exchequer, a kernishe felowe of loosse behavior...with these villans, and at the assaults theare weare loste some fiftie of them, theare weare X of theise villans that gave unto the King [of Poland] a petissione that they weare Banished [from] theayer cuntrye for theayer Consciences, and theayer lands tacken from them.

Chamberlayne overheard George Bingley declare that Ireland would one day be free of English rule. After Klushino there were many such Irish patriots in the Polish army, and at least one company of 80 Irishmen commanded by an Irish officer. Due to chronic funding problems, however,

151 R. Frost, *The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721* (Harlow, 2000), pp 68-9; Bussow, *Disturbed State*, pp 134-5; Purchas, *Hakluytus Posthumus*, xiv, pp 220-2; Zolkiewski, *Expedition*, pp 75, 80-1; Skrynnikov, *Time of Troubles*, pp 87-8; Floria, *Polsko-litovskaia interventsia*, p. 168; Miller, *Swords for Hire*, pp 78-9.

152 TNA, PRO, SP 88 (Poland/Saxony), pt. 3, ff 42-7. Thomas Chamberlayne to Robert Cecil, [1611], 47; Purchas, *Hakluytus Posthumus*, xiv, p. 222; Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers', p. 200; Bonner, *That Audacious Traitor*, p. 210.

153 Hugh O'Neill, quoted in M. Walsh, 'The Last Years of Hugh O'Neill: Rome, 1608-1616' in *The Irish Sword*, viii (1967-68), pp 230-1.

154 TNA, PRO, SP 88 (Poland/Saxony), pt. 3, ff 47-47v. Thomas Chamberlayne to Robert Cecil, [1611]; C. Talbot, ed., *Res Polonicae Iacobo I Angliae Regnante Conscriptae ex Archivis Publicis Londoniarum* [vol. VI of *Elementa ad Fontium Editiones*] (Rome, 1962), pp 120-1.



within three years several hundred Irish soldiers were cashiered from Polish military service. Many of those men, including former vassals of Hugh O'Neill, ended up wandering across Europe as hungry beggars. Some managed to reach Rome where they pleaded with the exiled earl of Tyrone for assistance. O'Neill tried to convince the king of Spain to let the men join the burgeoning Regiment of Tyrone, but it is not clear that any of them found employment in the Army of Flanders.<sup>155</sup> There were, of course, still plenty of Irishmen left in the Polish army. For example, when Prince Wladyslaw invaded Russia in 1617–18 in pursuit of the tsarist throne, Irish soldiers accompanied him all the way to the gates of Moscow.<sup>156</sup>

Not all Irish soldiers in Swedish service surrendered to the Poles at Klushino. Over one hundred of them retreated north out of Russia with remnants of the Swedish army.<sup>157</sup> Hugh O'Neill was informed by the Spanish ambassador in Rome that two companies of Irish soldiers garrisoned near Klushino but not participating in the battle were massacred in a reprisal by frustrated, defeated men looking for a scapegoat.<sup>158</sup> When a group of Irish soldiers who did join the Polish army at Klushino was later captured by Swedish troops, all of the turncoats were summarily executed by Russian forces.<sup>159</sup> Karl and his military advisors continued to complain about the unreliability of Irish soldiers, but nevertheless the Swedes kept hiring them in large numbers.<sup>160</sup> In July 1611 a newly recruited regiment of 300 Irish soldiers arrived at Narva under the command of Sir William Stewart. Within a month almost all of the men ran away to join nearby Polish military forces. Exasperated, Stewart wrote a letter to Robert Cecil requesting immediate replacements for the untrustworthy Irishmen and specifying that all new recruits should be Scots or Englishmen.<sup>161</sup> In spite of such problems, many Irish soldiers fought for Sweden during 1612. After one campaign, hundreds of unpaid mercenaries (including many Irishmen) negotiated an amicable departure from the war zone to

- 155 Walsh, *Destruction by Peace*, pp 97–8, 286, 300–01; idem, 'The Last Years of Hugh O'Neill: Rome, 1608–1616' in *The Irish Sword*, vii (1965–66), p. 336; IMC, pp 11–12. Eduardo de Mesa Gallego (*La pacificación de Flandes Spínola*) does not give an estimate of the number of Irish soldiers migrating to the Netherlands from Poland-Lithuania during the first decade and a half of the seventeenth century.
- 156 I. Massa, *A Short History of the Beginnings and Origins of these Present Wars in Moscow* (Toronto, 1982), p. 187.
- 157 Brereton, *Newes*, p. 52; Purchas, *Hakluytus Posthumus*, xiv, p. 222; Roberts, *Early Vasas*, p. 454.
- 158 Walsh, *An Exile of Ireland*, p. 94; idem, 'The Last Years of Hugh O'Neill: Rome, 1608–1616 in *The Irish Sword*, viii (1967–68), p. 230.
- 159 TNA, PRO, SP 95 (Sweden), pt. 1, f. 170, James Spens to Robert Cecil, 30 September 1610; TNA, PRO, SP 95, pt. 1, f. 177, James Spens to Robert Cecil, 8 November 1610; Murdoch and Grosjean, 'Irish Soldiers', p. 161; Murdoch, 'The Northern Flight', p. 91 n.21.
- 160 TNA, PRO, SP 95 (Sweden), pt. 1, f. 177, James Spens to Robert Cecil, 8 November 1610; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp 29–31; Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers', pp 199–200.
- 161 TNA, PRO, SP 91 (Russia), pt. 1, f. 222, William Stewart to Robert Cecil, 17 August 1611.

Finland.<sup>162</sup> Thousands of Irishmen continued to serve in Swedish military forces (usually as musketeers) for decades, and at least nine Irishmen became officers in the Swedish army during the Thirty Years War. But in 1631, due not to their religious faith but rather to their unreliability in wars against Catholic monarchs, King Gustav Adolf decided to stop hiring any more Irish soldiers.<sup>163</sup>

During Russia's 'Time of Troubles' Irish soldiers fought in the armies of Sweden and Poland-Lithuania. In the chaos of war a small number of Irishmen ended up in the Russian army. Irish and Scottish soldiers who joined the Polish army after the battle of Klushino fought in numerous campaigns. Two companies of those men (one Irish, one Scottish) were sent to garrison the town of Belaia. After a month-long siege during late summer 1613, Belaia was captured by Russian troops. Both companies surrendered and agreed to enter Russian service. They continued to garrison Belaia while maintaining their separate identities as Irish and Scottish companies. Several years later Tsar Mikhail Romanov agreed to cede Belaia to Poland-Lithuania as part of the truce ending Polish military intervention in Russia. That meant moving the 130 Irish and Scottish soldiers. Russian authorities declared a dozen men unfit for service due to age or disability and settled them at half pay near the town of Tula, a major regional military centre. A few Irishmen requested and received permission to return home. The rest were integrated as a company into a regiment of foreign troops stationed near Tula, and they continued to serve the tsar for many years – up to and including the Smolensk War (1632–34).<sup>164</sup>

When the mercenary soldiers were moved from Belaia, a few Irish and Scottish cavalymen petitioned Tsar Mikhail for transfer from the ranks of foreign troops into the ranks of the Russian gentry cavalymen. That promotion would entitle them to several hundred acres of land and to be considered gentlemen. Part of their petition reads as follows: 'We your slaves do not wish to go to our own land, because we have married here and have children, and we want to spill our blood for Thee the Sovereign.'<sup>165</sup> The names of many Irish soldiers appear in seventeenth-century Russian records.<sup>166</sup> Examination of Russian pay records for 1619–20 reveals that at least forty-five Irish soldiers in service near Tula received salaries, food, and fodder for their horses. Their Irish commanders, Brian O'Cahane

162 Murdoch and Grosjean, 'Irish Soldiers', p. 162; Murdoch, 'The Northern Flight', p. 92.

163 Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp 30–1, 65, 151; idem, 'Scotland: Sweden's Closest Ally?', pp 146, 151; Bonner, *That Audacious Traitor*, p. 210.

164 E. Stashevskii, *Smolenskaia voina 1632–1634 gg.* (Kiev, 1919), pp 9–14; P. Dukes, 'The First Scottish Soldiers in Russia', in G. Simpson (ed), *The Scottish Soldier Abroad 1247–1967* (Edinburgh, 1992), p. 48; Dunning, *Russia's First Civil War*, p. 450; Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers', p. 201; Skrynnikov, *Time of Troubles*, pp 281–2, 288; Zolkiewski, *Expedition*, pp 58, 146 n.89.

165 Stashevskii, *Smolenskaia voina*, pp 14–15; Dukes, 'First Scottish Soldiers', p. 48.

166 G. Phipps, 'Britons in Seventeenth-Century Russia: A Study in the Origins of Modernization' (PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1972), pp 87, 460–1.



and Thomas Iris, were treated as officers and received high salaries of ten to fifteen rubles per month. Russian efforts to spell the names of the 'irlanskie nemtsy' (Irish foreigners) are not always easy to decipher, but most of the names listed in the pay records are recognizably Irish.<sup>167</sup> With O'Hanlon and O'Cahane kinsmen among them, it is probable that a dozen or more of these soldiers were exiled Ulstermen far from home.

Tracing the fate of the Irishmen levied for Swedish military service in 1609–13 is a sobering exercise. As many as 1,000 never made it to Sweden, managing instead to go to the Netherlands or surreptitiously returning home. Of the 3,500 or more who arrived in Sweden, at least 1,000 died in battle or from wounds, illness, exposure, or starvation. That is a conservative estimate. According to General Zolkiewski, 1,200 foreign mercenaries died in one day at Klushino.<sup>168</sup> During the period 1609–13 at least 1,200 Irish soldiers abandoned Swedish forces to join the Polish army.<sup>169</sup> That was about one third of all Irish soldiers in Swedish service! Most of the other Irishmen who entered Swedish military service survived the Time of Troubles and can be accounted for in the armies of Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, Spain, and Russia.

The impact of the departure of so many Irish soldiers on Ireland and Irish history was significant. It is not too much to claim that the expulsion of 'idle swordsmen' from Ulster was an indispensable precondition for the success of the plantation schemes in Ulster. Indeed what sets the Plantation of Ulster apart from previous plantation projects during the Tudor period is precisely this, that only in this instance was plantation preceded by a systematic attempt to clear the designated territories of a substantial proportion of their human population. The numbers bear out this assessment. There were some 12,000 'idle swordsmen' living in Ireland in 1609, and perhaps a third of these were from Ulster.<sup>170</sup> Nearly

167 Irish soldiers in Russian service as of 1619–20 included Ian Bain, Ian Boyd, Gabriel Bredon, Ian Broom, Michael Bourke, William Carroll, Ian Cook, Art Donogh, Ian Duffy, Ian Farquhar, Ian Hett, Thomas Iris, William Johnson, Alexander Kerr, William Kerr, James MacAllen, Art MacGinn, Art MacKeen, Conagher MacKeen, Art MacMahon, Peter MacNailly, Art MacNamara, Donogh MacNamara, Patrick Monteith, Brian O'Cahane, Donogh O'Cahane, Michael O'Cahane, Ian O'Collins, Arthur O'Hanlon, Ian O'Kelly, Niall O'Mara, Ian Parekh, Edward Paull, Ian Roe, Frank Seul, Alexander Ward, Andrew Wood, Ian Wood, and Thomas Wyeast. See S. Veselovskii (ed), *Prikhodo-raskhodnye knigi moskovskikh prikazov 1619–21 gg.* (Moscow, 1983), pp 201–02, 211, 222–3, 226, 230, 235–7.

168 Zolkiewski, *Expedition*, p. 81.

169 Three hundred Irish soldiers switched sides and joined the Polish army in Spring 1610; seven companies of Irish soldiers switched sides during the Battle of Klushino; and 300 Irish soldiers deserted Narva to join Polish forces in July 1611. See TNA, PRO, SP 91 (Russia), pt. 1, f. 222, William Stewart to Robert Cecil, 17 August 1611; Brereton, *News*, pp 53–4; Zhordaniia, *Ocherki*, i, p. 263; Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers', pp 199–200; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 30; T. Walsh, 'The Last Years of Hugh O'Neill: Rome, 1608–1616' in *The Irish Sword*, viii (1967–68), pp 230–1.

170 CSPI, iii, p. 299; Fitzsimon, 'Irish Swordsmen', p. 23; O'Meagher, *Some Historical Notices*, p. 54.

half of all those unemployed Irish soldiers were sent to Sweden and Russia in what might be described as a forced experiment in social engineering. In Ulster, the focus of the most intense recruitment by press-gang, the impact was more pronounced than elsewhere. In fact, one reason why Ulster exported comparatively few soldiers for the rest of the seventeenth century is because so many Ulstermen were banished in the period 1609–13.<sup>171</sup>

Much of the northern half of Ireland was effectively pacified by James I's transportation scheme, and this pacification greatly facilitated the success of plantation policy in Ulster. There were no further military levies after the 1620s, and the Rising of 1641 (which has from time to time been credited with great significance as a turning point in Irish history and Anglo-Irish relations) was both as predictable and predictably futile as O'Doherty's rebellion in 1608. In the end the Rising of 1641 had a similar outcome: land confiscation and population transportation under Cromwell and his lieutenants in the 1650s. A precedent had been established by King James that helped change Ulster permanently and embittered the remaining Gaelic population.<sup>172</sup>

171 E. O Hannracháin, 'Who were the 'Wild Geese'?' in *Études irlandaises* xxv (2000), p.105; Cullen, 'Irish Diaspora', p. 120.

172 In addition to documents in British archives concerning Irish soldiers transported to Sweden in the period 1609–13 cited in this article, useful information about many of those Irishmen is contained in Swedish archives. See, for example, muster rolls located in The Swedish Military Archives (*Krigsarkiv*) and the large collection of 'Anglica' held in The National Archives of Sweden (*Riksarkiv*). See also *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefväxling* (22 vols, Stockholm, 1890–1977) and J.E. Waaranen (ed), *Handlingar upplysande Finlands Historia under Gustav II Adolfs tid. Utgifne efter samlarens död af Finska Statsarkivet. 1611–[1618]* (2 vols, Helsinki, 1874–78). Additional information may be found in the Oxenstierna Database Project of The National Archives of Sweden ('The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna, Chancellor of Sweden 1612–1654'), available in an electronic version ([http://finpro.ra.se/ra/ao/soksida\\_enkel.html](http://finpro.ra.se/ra/ao/soksida_enkel.html)). Also of use is 'The Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database' (SSNE) compiled by Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, and available on-line ([www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne](http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne)). Also available on-line and highly relevant are the 'Letters of James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna' ([http://62.20.57.212/ra/ao/Spens\\_in\\_ENG.html](http://62.20.57.212/ra/ao/Spens_in_ENG.html)). The authors of this article are seeking funding to travel to British, Irish, and Swedish archives for additional research on this project.



# Index

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